When is war justified? Could anything justify nuclear or biochemical warfare? Should lethal robots be banned? Are conscripts' deaths any better than noncombatants'? Should only states wage wars? Are postwar tribunals merely ‘victors' justice’?

We will explore ethical questions concerning initiating, pursuing and responding to war. No previous philosophy required.

Are morals peacetime luxuries? Is pacifism right? Or was Grotius correct to distinguish just from unjust wars? Can only states legitimately wage wars? If so, are revolutions and civil wars never justified?

Could anything justify the use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons? Who is responsible if lethal robots kill erroneously? Are conscripts' deaths any less bad than those of noncombatants? Must one endeavour to avoid harming civilians even if they are actively assisting the enemy? Who is entitled to prisoner of war status?

Are war criminals just those whose bad luck puts them on the losing side? Are postwar tribunals inevitably ‘victors' justice’? Is it fair to judge choices made in ‘the fog of war’ by peacetime standards?

What obligations do we have to those fleeing conflict? Can states permissibly prohibit citizens from fighting others' wars? When is conscription justified? How should conscientious objectors be treated?

We will explore ethical questions which arise for those initiating, pursuing or responding to war. No previous knowledge of philosophy or warfare required.

• demonstrate an understanding of core elements of the course material;
• identify central ethical questions concerning war and key positions addressing them;

• evaluate ethical claims concerning war, in the context of historical and contemporary discussions;
• understand relevant empirical considerations and discussions of their philosophical implications;
• understand relevant legal discussions and their philosophical implications;
• bring the insights of philosophy to bear on questions concerning war, the law and public policy.

Intellectual Skills:

By the end of the period of learning, the typical student will be able to:

• analyse the structure of an argument;

• critically evaluate an argument;
• compare and contrast different positions on an issue;
• adjudicate disputes.

Discipline Specific (including practical) Skills:

By the end of the period of learning, the typical student will be able to:

• critically read and analyse a philosophical text;

• use philosophical vocabulary appropriate to the subject matter of the specific course;
• formulate and defend a philosophical thesis;
• constructively discuss philosophical ideas with others.

This course is taught in 10, two-hour sessions, delivered on a weekly basis.

There will be a mixture of lectures and seminars, the precise proportion to be determined by the needs of the students enrolled. The seminar element may include debate, discussion, group activities, presentations and readings. Additional reading material will be recommended and a reading list will be supplied. If appropriate, other materials such as documentaries may also be included. Course handouts will be provided as appropriate.

The seminars will encourage the development of knowledge and understanding of the ideas and concepts discussed in the course. Intellectual skills will be encouraged through participation in class discussion, reading and coursework.

Academic Skills:

By the end of the period of learning, the typical student will have:

• found relevant resources in the library and online;

• assessed the reliability of different sources of information;
• demonstrated a critical approach to academic texts.

Transferable/employability Skills:

By the end of the period of learning, the typical student will have shown that s/he can:

• recognise, analyse and criticise arguments;

• explain and defend a view clearly and concisely whether orally or in writing;
• respond constructively to disagreement;
• evaluate claims in the context of historical and contemporary debates concerning war;
• formulate useful questions in the context of philosophical theory, historical and current conflicts, hypothetical cases, judicial opinion, the law and public policy.

Issue identification  5%  Question Formulation  Various  

Exegesis of 400-500 words  20%   Case Study  Agreed by week 3/4 and submitted in week 6/7

Paper of 1,300-1,500 words   75%    Paper  Set by week 5/6 and submitted shortly after end of course

We will be concerned with normative questions concerning wars, individuals, states, non-state groups and international institutions. Discussion will be informed, as appropriate, by classical and contemporary philosophy, historical examples, hypothetical cases, current conflicts and law, including relevant judicial judgements and legislative issues in domestic and international contexts.

The following list of sample topics illustrates the kind of subject matter which may be discussed but the specific issues selected will vary. The questions listed for each topic are intended as representative examples of relevant issues and are not intended to exhaust those which might be discussed.

Fundamental questions

• Are morals peacetime luxuries or is war properly subject to ethical evaluation?
• Is pacifism the only credible moral position or are some wars justified?
• Is there any fundamental moral difference between killing in self-defence or to defend others and killing when ordered to do so in defence of one’s community or country?
  • Does the state of war alter the morally permissible reasons for inflicting harm on others?
  • Or are these reasons essentially the same as those which pertain in peacetime?
• When is it permissible, impermissible or required to serve in the armed forces or as part of a non-state armed group?
  • Is it permissible to volunteer for the armed forces? Or for a non-state militia?
  • Is it permissible, impermissible or required to serve or to refuse to serve when conscripted?

Just war theory

• Should we focus on the requirements for just institutions, such as legislative frameworks and judicial procedures?
  • This might be the approach favoured by contractualists and indirect consequentialists, for example.
  • On this view, what individuals and groups should do is act in accordance with these rules.
• Or should we focus on the ethical standards appropriate when evaluating particular actions, strategies and policies?
  • Direct consequentialists, non-contractualist deontologists and virtue ethicists might favour this approach.
  • On this view, what individuals and groups should do is act in accordance with the moral reasons they have.
• Since there will be occasions when the best set of rules yields unfortunate outcomes and, at a minimum, rules may be useful as guidelines for assessing cases, how should conflicts between legality and morality be resolved?
  • What should be done if torturing a prisoner of war is the only way to prevent a city of civilians from being poisoned?
• Do collectives have interests or status over and above the sum of the individuals which constitute them?
  • Is it permissible to wage a defensive war to protect a people’s linguistic, cultural or religious identity, even if doing so will result in greater harm to the individuals who constitute that people?
• Must an acceptable just war theory deal adequately with hypothetical scenarios, however implausible, or should it seek instead to address scenarios grounded in historical experience and current reality, however messy? Assuming some balance should be struck, does this balance differ significantly from that required in other areas of practical ethics?
• Historical just war theory divides ethical issues into jus ad bellum (the ethics of resorting to war) and jus in bello (the just conduct of war).
  • Jus ad bellum

When is resort to war justified?

Standard criteria: just cause, right intention, proper authority & public declaration, last resort, probability of success, proportionality

• Are these traditional criteria jointly sufficient and individually necessary? Could they be reduced to those of necessity and proportionality or, even, to necessity alone?
• What constitutes a just cause?
• Is right intention necessary? Can intentions be properly attributed to states or non-state groups, as opposed to the individuals which constitute them?
• Who exactly is potentially justified in initiating war?
  • Is this limited to (legitimate?) states? Or are non-state groups sometimes entitled to wage war?
    • Is armed rebellion, revolution or civil war ever justified?
• What constitutes a public declaration in the case of a non-state group?
• Does last resort require the same efforts in the case of conflicts involving states and non-state groups? For example, it may not be clear how to contact a non-state group or difficult to ascertain who legitimately speaks for such a group.
• Is the likelihood of success necessary?
  • Some non-state groups might initially be very unlikely to succeed given their current resources, but unable to determine how these resources might expand once they initiate conflict.
  • Some states’ defensive planning is premised on the assumption that they could not succeed in repelling a likely aggressor. Instead, their plans seek to make invasion so costly that no aggressor will attempt invasion. If an aggressor nonetheless invades, is the state morally required to surrender immediately?
• In assessing proportionality, do all harms count equally or should we count or weigh more heavily only wrongful harms? How far into the future should we try to project harms and benefits?
• Who exactly bears responsibility for unjust wars?
• Jus in bello

When is a particular act of war, policy or military strategy justified?

Standard criteria: compliance with international laws on weapons prohibition, discrimination & non-combatant immunity, proportionality, benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war (POWs), no intrinsically evil weapons or methods, no reprisals

• Do the same ethical standards apply when evaluating harmful acts performed as part of military operations as apply when evaluating similar acts of harm performed in other contexts?
• Are some methods or strategies always wrong, regardless of the justness of one’s cause and the extremity of one’s situation?
  • Can the use of nuclear weapons ever be justified?
  • What about the use of biological warfare?
  • What about chemical weapons?

Should the use of autonomous weapons be restricted or prohibited?

• Does the distinction between combatants and non-combatants have the moral significance the traditional criterion accords it?
  • Is it ever permissible to target civilians? What about the infrastructure on which civilians rely, such as sewage treatment plants, water purification facilities, food stores and hospitals? Does it make a difference if those facilities are also used by combatants? What if the combatants disguise themselves as non-combatants? What if they are not uniformed in the first place?
  • Are all enemy combatants legitimate targets? Does it make a difference if they are conscripts? What if they are morally injured or escorting civilians to safety?
  • If the enemy utilises unwilling non-combatants as a ‘human shield’ surrounding a military installation, is it permissible to strike that installation, even if one cannot do so without killing many of the non-combatants?
• How should proportionality be evaluated? Do all harms count equally?
• How should prisoners of war be treated? Who is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war?
  • Are guerillas or members of non-state militias entitled to this status? Does it make a difference if they are not in uniform so that one can’t distinguish them from the civilian population?
• What makes a weapon or method ‘intrinsically evil’?
• Are reprisals never justified even if they will prevent far greater harms?
• Who exactly bears responsibility for unjust acts?
  • Under what circumstances can members of the military be justly blamed for obeying orders?

• Contemporary just war theory has expanded discussion to encompass jus ex bello or jus terminatio (the ethics of exiting war) and/or jus post bellum (the conditions of a just peace).
  • Jus ex bello
    • When is peace justified?
  • Jus post bellum

Standard criteria: just termination of war, rights vindication, discrimination, just punishment for rights violations and war crimes, compensation, rehabilitation

• What makes a postwar settlement just?
• What is required to secure the rights whose violation justified war?
• Is it possible to require compensation etc.\ without punishing non-combatants?
• Does justice demand, prohibit or permit postwar prosecutions?
  • Can postwar judicial proceedings ever deliver more than ‘victors’ justice’?
  • How should tribunals be constituted?
  • Can international institutions provide the impartiality which some observers thought missing from the Nuremberg trials, which did not seek justice for Allied crimes, such as the bombing of German cities or the use of atomic bombs in Japan?
• What kind of compensation, if any, may be legitimately exacted and on what conditions?
• When are foreign victors permitted or required to interfere with the domestic affairs and constitution of defeated states?

Special issues

• Are there specific obligations to children caught up in conflicts?
• How should medical personnel be treated? Does it matter whether they are from neutral organisations such as MSF or members of the military? Does it matter whether they are prepared to treat all wounded equally?
• How should journalists be treated? Does it make a difference if the news organisations they represent have taken sides in the conflict?
• When is conscription permissible?
• Who may be permissibly conscripted?
  • Is it permissible to conscript women, even if women are vulnerable to additional abuses? For example, although both men can be raped, the rape of women prisoners of war might be more likely and women are uniquely liable to pregnancy as a result.
• How should conscientious objectors be treated?
• Can some forms of economic sanctions, cyber-attacks or disinformation campaigns be considered acts of war?
• What truth-telling obligations do states at war have to their own citizens?

Third parties

• Do states have any general obligation to interfere in wars between states to whom they owe no treaty obligations?
  • Does it matter if justice is on the side of the militarily weaker state? If so, does it matter how much weaker?
• What obligations do states have to civilians fleeing conflicts?
• May states legitimately prohibit their own citizens from participating in wars they are not themselves party to?
• Is it legitimate for governments, academic institutions, cultural organisations or individuals to proscribe the economic, cultural or intellectual products of a state waging an unjust war? Does it make a difference if that state’s citizens oppose or support the war? If so, does it matter whether their support depends on a sincere belief that the war is just?
  • For example, is it permissible to cancel theatrical performances even if those performances make no economic contribution to the state waging the unjust war? Is cancellation an admirable show of solidarity with the victims of injustice or morally dubious condemnation by association?

The course may draw on case studies and examples from fiction and non-fiction to illustrate the theoretical positions discussed and students are encouraged to draw further examples from their own experience.